Demand driven growth and two class capital distribution with applications to the United States by Kumar, Rishabh et al.
California State University, San Bernardino 
CSUSB ScholarWorks 
Economics Faculty Publications Economics 
Fall 2017 
Demand driven growth and two class capital distribution with 




New School for Social Research, schoderc@newschool.edu 
Siavash Radpour 
New School for Social Reseach, SRadpour@newschool.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.lib.csusb.edu/economics-publications 
 Part of the Political Economy Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Kumar, Rishabh; Schoder, Christian; and Radpour, Siavash, "Demand driven growth and two class capital 
distribution with applications to the United States" (2017). Economics Faculty Publications. 2. 
https://scholarworks.lib.csusb.edu/economics-publications/2 
This Unpublished Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Economics at CSUSB ScholarWorks. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Economics Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of CSUSB 
ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact scholarworks@csusb.edu. 
Demand driven growth and two class capital
distribution with applications to the United StatesI
Rishabh Kumar1,, Christian Schoder2,, Siavash Radpour3,
Abstract
We present a structuralist growth and distribution model of capitalists
and workers. Our model highlights the role of class-differentiated savings
propensities as well as an independent accumulation function in determining
the dynamics of wealth distribution in the long run. At the steady state,
investment parameters do not influence the distribution of wealth but there
exists a long run paradox of thrift effect, which distributes wealth to capital-
ists whilst simultaneously exerting downward pressure on the long run state
of aggregate demand. Applied to annual US data from 1950-2015 using the
Metropolis-Hastings algorithm we find that the share of capitalist wealth will
stabilize at approximately 68%, fairly close to the Kotlikoff-Summers dynas-
tic capital range. We estimate the ratio of worker-capitalist saving propen-
sities to be as low as 6%. Our paper has implications for the interaction
between wealth inequality and long run economic stagnation in low-growth
mature economies.
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1. Introduction
In this paper we try to answer important issues regarding the interaction
of aggregate demand and the concentration of wealth. While there has been a
resurgence on the literature4 which discuss theoretical and empirical aspects
of wealth inequality, less attention has been devoted to addressing the impact
of wealth concentration on macroeconomic performance. Traditional models
either choose to optimize saving or assume that the long run rate of economic
growth is exogenous and determined by demographic parameters. In many
such models either wealth ends up completely in the hands of one group
which has the highest incentive to save or the distribution of wealth is directly
proportional to the marginal contribution of different actors - evidence points
to neither of these facts being empirically verified.
. Our paper proceeds in a systematic manner, motivated by two important
stylized trends captured in Figure B.1 and Figure B.2. The former chart
shows a relatively stable distribution of profits in US national income, with
a slight increase in the last half decade. The latter chart shows (for the
post war US economy) a slight decline in the long run ratio of output to
the fixed private capital stock utilized in the production process. Thus while
the share of wages and profit is relatively unchanged, the productivity of
capital has declined. These trends square up with the recently highlighted
secular stagnation argument, promoted in Summers (2014) where the author
proceeds to link the decline in aggregate demand to a concentration of income
and wealth amongst high-savers (amongst other reasons).
[Figure 1 about here.]
[Figure 2 about here.]
We distinguish our analysis in this paper in two ways. First we present a the-
oretical two-class model (capitalists and workers) where output is demand-
determined and based on an independent accumulation function which re-
sponds to profitability. Our models set limits for the proportion of wealth
held by either class exploiting the fact that while capitalists by definition
only earn capital income, workers (who also engage in saving) have access
to both wages and returns to capital claims generated by their past saving.
4See for example the summary in Piketty (2015)
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By avoiding a neoclassical production function structure we are able to high-
light the role of savings behavior on both long run distribution and output
growth. We use US data to calibrate this model using Bayesian estimation
techniques and compute the rate of capitalist saving as well as predict steady
state values for the share of wealth owned capitalists and workers. We ensure
consistency between our highly simplified one-good model by using appro-
priate data related to the fixed private capital stock, as opposed to the sum
of all private assets.
. We show that (theoretically) in a demand driven growth model, investment
parameters do not have any impact on the distribution of inter-class wealth
but instead only influence the rate of profit and productivity of capital. Simi-
lar to the model of Pasinetti (1962), workers cannot influence growth or rates
of return but only influence their steady state share of wealth. Our empirical
findings imply that capitalists’ share wealth will stabilize at 68%, based on
historical trends and driven by saving approximately 73% of their (capital-
ists) income. Independent of profitability, our computations show that the
US economy has a long run rate of growth of roughly 1.5%.These estimates
have important implications for policies seeking to achieve both equity and
improved macroeconomic performance.
. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we discuss
theoretical and empirical literature related to our analysis. In section 3 we
develop our theoretical model then proceeding the estimate and calibrate
it in section 4. Section 5 concludes by discussing the implications of our
propositions and findings.
2. Related Literature
2.1. Literature on capital accumulation
Our paper and model follow in the tradition of structuralist growth mod-
els where both the long and short run are influenced endogenously by ag-
gregate demand rather than an exogenous natural growth rate. A range of
possible models and specifications are available for the interested reader in
Taylor (2009). In particular, for mature low growth economies such as the US
or Western Europe the issue of chronic long run stagnation of aggregate de-
mand5 are more appropriate in our perspective, as opposed to the benchmark
5See for example Summers (2014)
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neoclassical growth models which follow Solow (1956). The model closest to
our specification is perhaps the two class growth and distribution models in
Pasinetti (1962) and extended in Taylor (2014). Were we to consider issues
of capital accumulation even in the neoclassical tradition, recent evidence
points to possible savings gluts6 generating a drag on the profitability of ac-
cumulation. For example Geerolf (2013) overturns the original results on the
excess of the profit share over investment in GDP as found by Abel et al.
(1989) for rich economies.
. The second range of literature we draw upon highlight the definition of
capital. In our model, we exclusively focus on a one-good model of accumu-
lation so that output can be consumed or saved as wealth. In general, the
evolution of capital stock to national income can occur due to both savings
or due to a relative rise/fall in asset prices. We stress that this issue is re-
lated to which assets are counted in the definition of wealth. For example,
by counting all private wealth as capital Piketty and Zucman (2014) show
a greater decline in the output capital ratio. This non-standard definition
leads to inconsistent outcomes regarding the share of capital income and rate
of return (both increasing), implying a high elasticity of substitution between
labor and capital and has been criticized in many quarters7.
2.2. Literature on distribution
We draw on the findings of Saez and Zucman (2016) regarding rising US
wealth inequality. Empirical estimates of saving also point to an increase
in the rate of saving going up the income distribution, particularly for the
US in Dynan et al. (2004) and Kumar (2016). However, our focus is less on
identifying fractiles of the population amongst whom wealth is being con-
centrated and instead on distinguishing classes based on sources of income.
Data does not permit an easy identification of the so-called capitalist class
although many workers fulfill out definition by engaging in savings only for
lifecycle purposes. At the same time, this allows us to highlight our assump-
tions regarding differential saving between capitalists and workers. Perhaps
one simple way of justifying this possibility is that models based on simple
lifecycle and bequest motives fail to capture the rate of saving observed in US
6Themselves linked to income and wealth concentration amongst higher saving classes.
7See for example Semieniuk (2017) and Chirinko (2008) for estimates of the elasticity
of substitution
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data. This is best captured in Carroll (1998) who proposes a capitalist spirit
model where the explicit motivation to accumulate wealth directly enters the
utility function and fits the data much better. We rely on such motivations
to model a two class economy where capitalists are similar to a dynastic class
whose motivation for accumulation is over and above dynastic transmission
or lifecycle saving.
2.3. Literature on demand driven models
Finally we follow in the tradition of models which link demand and distri-
bution in a unified framework. Two strands of this literature are important
for our purposes. First, we closely follow the model Pasinetti (1962) which
is itself representative of rich debate8 on growth and distribution. Second,
the issue of macroeconomic stability was related to investment and saving
behavior by Bhaduri and Marglin (1990) which we utilize in our analysis.
Setterfield (2017) reviews the features of models9 that follow in the Bhaduri-
Marglin tradition in a comprehensive manner.
3. A growth model with capitalists and workers
We define a simple highly stylized aggregate economy populated by cap-
italists and workers. Both classes engage in saving with the conventional
distinction that capitalists save (sc) at a higher rate than workers (sw) so
that sc > sw. Capitalists earn capital income on their stock of capital (Kc)
and workers earn wages as well as returns on the capital stock (Kw) accu-
mulated through their past saving. We assume throughout a uniform rate of
return r regardless of the class of its owner so that capital income earned is
only distinguished by the size of capital (rKw, rKc). The functional distribu-
tion of income pi is defined by the share of profits (or capital income) in total
income X. By definition, the share of wages 1 − pi accrues only to workers
while both classes extend claims on capital income. Since we only discuss a
one good framework, output can be consumed or saved as wealth hence we
use the terms wealth and capital interchangeably. We denote the share of
8In the 1960s, the debate initiated by Pasinetti was followed by neoclassical responses
by Samuelson and Modigliani (1966) and Stiglitz (1969). Nearly all these models assumed
the long run rate of growth to be exogenous to macroeconomic factors.
9This issue of the Review of Keynesian Economics (Edward Elgar Publishing) has a
range of articles devoted to this issue.
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capitalist wealth as Z = Kc
K
so that the share of wealth owned by workers is
simply 1 − Z. Aggregate savings S can be decomposed into worker savings
(Sw) and capitalist savings (Sc):
S = Sw + Sc = sw ((1− pi)X + rKw)︸ ︷︷ ︸
income earned by workers
+scrKc
In simple accounting terms, the rate of profit can be decomposed into the
share of profits and the ratio of output to capital (or the inverse of the
wealth-income ratio in a one good economy) so that r = piX
K
. We symbolize
the output capital ratio as u so r = piu. Dividing throughout by X, we get
the aggregate saving rate, s:
s = scZpi︸ ︷︷ ︸
weighted capitalist saving rate
+ sw(1− Z)pi + sw(1− pi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
weighted worker saving rate
(1)
To distinguish our analysis from the benchmark neoclassical models, we en-
dogenize the accumulation rate or the investment-capital ratio as a linear
function of the (net of depreciation) rate of profit. This is standard in the
structuralist literature, separating the motives to save (or abstain from con-
sumption) from the entrepreneurial impulse to accumulate and follows, for
example the model of Taylor (2014). Investment (net-of-depreciation) as a
ratio of the capital stock is denoted by g:
g = g0 + αr = g0 + αpiu = g(pi, Z) (2)
with g = Kˆ = K˙/K as the accumulation rate (or the investment-capital
ratio), there are two parts to accumulation. g0 is an independent or exogenous
term10 while α > 0 is the sensitivity of investment to profitability.11 Since
effective demand must be set to zero, or investment must be identical to
savings therefore gK ≡ sX or u = g/s. Using expressions 1 and 2 we derive
the reduced form expression for the output capital ratio:
u =
g0
sw + ((sc − sw)Z − α)pi = u(pi, Z) (3)
Note that in the short run with pi and Z given, the paradox of thrift applies,
i.e for any level of saving s′i > si output is lower relative to the capital stock
i.e u′ < u.
10Analogous to animal spirits in the Keynesian tradition
11The symbols dots and hats indicating time derivatives and growth rates respectively.
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3.1. Short run stability and response to the profit share
Expression 3 allows to derive important properties of the macroeconomic
systems and parameters. An important feature for the stability of a demand
driven model is the so-called Keynesian stability system as for example in
Bhaduri and Marglin (1990). These conditions dictate that the difference in
the responses of investment and savings must be negative for any increase in







or scpiZ + sw(1− Z)pi + sw(1− pi)− αpi > 0
For any 0 < pi < 1 and 1 > sc > sw > 0, these conditions are fulfilled
for sc > α, i.e the capitalist propensity to save must exceed the response of
investment to the rate of profit. In the forthcoming section, we show this to
be fulfilled quite easily.
The second important property of the macroeconomic system is the response
of the output-capital ratio to a change in the functional income distribution.
An economy is defined as profit-led (wage-led) if an increase in the share










Taking the partial derivative of 3 against pi for any g0 > 0, we can define the
profit or wage led character of the economy at any given level of the capitalist
wealth share Z:
Profit led: Z <
α
sc − sw or Wage led: Z >
α
sc − sw (4)
The inequality conditions specified in (4) will be important for the long run
steady state as well, which we discuss in further sections. For the moment,
this completes the analytics of the short run demand driven system.
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3.2. Long run steady state
We are interested in wealth inequality between capitalists and workers,
for which we allow Z to evolve in the long run. The law of motion for Z is a
simple accounting framework which states that the share of capitalist wealth
increases (decreases) if they accumulate faster (slower) than the aggregate
economy - or Zˆ = Kˆc − Kˆ. Since capitalists only earn capital income, their







As previously defined, u = u(pi, Z) and g = g(pi, z). We fix the functional
distribution of income pi = p¯i to define a single differential equation for the
long run:
Z˙ = Z (scp¯iu(Z)− g0 − αp¯iu(Z)) = φ(Z) (5)
Any theory of the distribution of income, whether determined by a neoclas-
sical production function technology or via alternate theories of the tradeoff
between profits and wages is a closure distinguishing growth models. We
impose a strong dynamic restriction by fixing the functional income distri-
bution to keep the analysis parsimonious yet interesting due to its demand
driven nature.12 When aggregate demand goes up and capital is more effi-
ciently utilized to produce higher output, u increases and the rate of profit
also increases since r = p¯iu. In Appendix A, we discuss the implications of
a fully accommodating functional income distribution which transforms the
paradox of thrift into a long run paradox of wealth and is closely related to
our short run inequalities in expression (4) which distinguish wage-led and
profit-led regimes. Based on equation (5) we define the steady state:
Theorem 1. For the law of motion of wealth distribution in (5), there exists
a Z∗ > 0 such that Z˙ = 0 so that g∗ = g(Z∗) and u∗ = u(Z∗).
12In neoclassical growth, for a Cobb Douglas production function X = KpiL1−pi the
share of profits is given by pi = p¯i but the rate of growth is also given at g = g¯. Our
long run dynamics are distinguished by the linear accumulation function which separate
investment and saving decisions. Stiglitz (1969) presents a neoclassical theory of wealth
distribution on similar lines as our analysis but under a given growth rate and linear
savings functions.
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(sw − sc)p¯i (6)
From the above, the responses of the distribution of wealth to savings propen-
sities of either class are straightforward. For any given functional income dis-
tribution 0 < p¯i < 1, the steady state share of capitalists wealth Z∗ responds
positively to capitalist saving i.e ∂Z
∗
∂sc
> 0 and negatively to worker saving i.e
∂Z∗
∂sw
< 0 for sc > sw. At the steady state, the wealth of capitalists grows at







Note that this expression is the famous Cambridge equation due to Pasinetti
(1962). In his original model however Pasinetti defined the rate of growth as
given, similar to neoclassical growth models. In our model, the rate of return
is intrinsically linked to investment parameters through g. By substituting
g∗ = g(Z∗) we get:
r∗ =
g0
sc − α, u
∗ =
g0
(sc − α)p¯i (8)
Thus in the case that α = 0 so that the accumulation is given (g = g0) we
get an analogous expression to Pasinetti. Regardless, the saving behavior of
workers does not influence the steady state rate of profit or the output-capital
ratio. Secondly, the Keynesian stability condition (sc−α) defined previously
ensures feasible (non-negative) values of the steady state rate of profit and
the output-capital ratio. We can combine the expressions (6) and (8) to get
the following important properties:
Remark 1. The distribution of wealth between capitalists and workers is
independent of the investment parameters for the aggregate economy α and
g0. On the other hand at the steady state the rate of return is positively
related to α and output per unit of capital stock is higher for larger values of
g0 and α.
In Appendix B we provide parametric values necessary to obtain a range of
distributions such as an egalitarian wealth distribution as well as complete
ownership of wealth by workers or capitalists. In further sections, our empiri-
cal analysis will show that parameters are well within the bounds to generate
a distribution rather than single class capital ownership.
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3.2.1. Stability of Z∗
Finally, to conclude the theoretical framework we derive the conditions




Which from substitution of (6) into (5) yields
g0 (sw − p¯isc)
p¯i (sc − α) < 0
The stability conditions are fulfilled for g ∈ [0, 1], 0 < sw < sc < 1 and




share of profits in total income should be greater than the ratio of savings
propensities of workers to capitalists. So for example, if workers save 10%
of their income and capitalists save 50% of their income then the long run
distribution of wealth is stable if profits are greater than 0.1
0.5
= 20% of national
income. Under this parametric restriction, we know from Appendix B that
there is a wealth distribution as opposed to complete ownership of wealth by
either class.
Thus our stylized economy behaves in the following way - for the param-
eters [sc, sw, g0, α] and a given functional income distribution p¯i, the distribu-
tion of wealth stabilizes in the long run at Z∗ starting from any Z0. Output
grows at the rate of accumulation of capital stock g∗ to maintain a constant
output-capital ratio u∗. Note that we do not explicitly model any differen-
tial fertility rates between the two classes and focus on the the aggregate
behavior. Our results would be different if the natural growth rates of either
class differ from each other or even from the long run accumulation rate g∗
but we do not discuss these in the context of this model. Our theoretical
framework is highly stylized and only intended to illustrate the dynamics of
wealth distribution in a two class demand-driven setting. Without calibrat-
ing the parameters of this model, there is little more we can say about its
implications for actual economies.
4. Calibration to US economy: 1950-2015
The Post-Keynesian literature offers different approaches to calibration
of growth models, none of which we find entirely satisfying for our pur-
poses: early Post-Keynesians typically calibrate the model such that selected
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moments of the data, typically steady-state ratios, are matched. Hein and
Schoder (2011), among others, estimate the model parameters using a single-
equation Ordinary Least Squares approach. However, as argued by Schoder
(2017a) this approach is likely to yield biased results and ignores the uncer-
tainty of estimates.
To parameterize the current model we follow Schoder (2017b) and esti-
mate the k model parameters θ using Bayesian inference. That is, we combine
our prior believes about the probability distribution of the model parameters
p(θ) with the likelihood that these parameters give rise to the data observed
p(y|θ). This allows us to make a probability statement about the parameters
given the data, i.e. p(θ|y). This principle of Bayesian inference is condensed




Note that θ is a vector of parameters. Yet, we would like to make a probability




p(θ|y)dθ1 · · · θi−1θi+1 · · · θk.
The required integration cannot be done analytically, in general. Hence we
apply a simulation method to draw from p(θi|y) for all i. In particular we
apply the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm, a Markov chain Monte Carlo sim-
ulation method details of which can be found in any introductory text on
Bayesian statistics (Greenberg, 2012).
4.1. Estimation
[Table 1 about here.]
We utilize historical US data for estimation and calibration, taking g, r,
and u as observed variables and the rest as unobserved. Subsequently we sys-
tematically approximate the values of observed variables for the period 1950
to 2015, using data from NIPA tables and depreciation and capital stock data
reported by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Note that throughout
we have emphasized a one-good model for our stylized economy and hence
abstract from asset price effects. Therefore we use the stock of private fixed
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assets as our measure of capital stock - this also permits us to avoid the
volatility caused by fluctuations in the value of financial assets. We use the
ratio of the investment in private fixed assets (I) net of depreciation (D) to
the stock of private fixed assets (PFA) as a proxy for the accumulation rate
g. The ratio of income from profit (PI) as the sum of pre-tax rental income,
net interest payments, and corporate profit adjusted for capital consumption
to the stock of private fixed assets (PFA) is used as our measure of r. We
exclude proprietors income from our calculations to avoid mixed income def-
initions. Table B.1 presents a detailed list of variables, and NIPA tables and
other BEA data used in their calculations. Since sc and sw always appear
in our equations together, one of them should be manually calibrated. We
assume the saving propensity of wage earners, sw at 5%, a rough average of
the average personal saving rate in the NIPA accounts which varies tempo-
rally between 2-8%. Thus our estimations of the capitalist saving propensity




[Table 2 about here.]
Table B.2 presents the estimation results for 50,000 iterations and 2
Markov chains. These specifications are sufficient to guarantee convergence
of the simulated distribution to the distribution of interest i.e. p(θ|y). The
Bayesian approach combines prior beliefs with data. The prior beliefs are in-
corporated in the prior distributions p(θi) for all i. These are reported in the
second to fourth column of the parameters estimated. We choose rather large
variances for the prior distribution which means that our confidence in our
prior beliefs are rather weak. In particular, we follow the conventional liter-
ature and assume an inverse gamma distribution for the estimated standard
deviations of the disturbances.
. For parameters which are constrained by 0 and 1 we assume a beta distri-
bution and for parameters constrained to be positive we assume a gamma
distribution. Columns 5 and 6 report moments of interest of the posterior
distributions p(θi|y). The estimated mean for the capitalist propensity to
save (sc) is 0.734 and falls in the range of 0.641 and 0.818 with a 90% prob-
ability. The mean of the profit share (pi) is estimated to be 0.188 with a
narrow probability interval. This is not surprising as this is consistent with
the mean implied by pi = r/u recalling that both r and u are observed. For
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the intercept and slope parameters (g0, α) of the investment function we find
as the means 0.015 and 0.214, respectively. The remaining parameters are of
less economic interest as they capture the persistence of the shock processes
(ρpi, ρsc, and ρg) as well as the standard deviations of the innovations (σpi,
σsc, and σg).
4.2. Dynamics of US capital distribution
[Figure 3 about here.]
In Figure B.3 we plot the phase diagram for the differential equation in 5
with the parameters calibrated to our estimated values. The parameters
fulfill all our assumptions for stability hence the steady state distribution
of wealth is limited in the interval Z∗ ∈ [0, 1] at 0.684. That is, calibrated
to historical US data our model predicts that in the long run, capitalists
will own approximately 68% of the aggregate productive capital stock. At
Z > Z∗, for pi = p¯i the output capital ratio is lower and exerts downward
pressure on the rate of profit. Since capitalists only earn capital income, this
reduces their share of income and for unchanged sc returns the distribution
of wealth to Z∗. For Z < Z∗ aggregate demand is higher and increases the
rate of profit and capitalists’ income hence increasing their share of wealth
until the distribution of wealth reaches the steady state.
Our model predicts a higher wealth share than predicted by the esti-
mates of Saez and Zucman (2016) for the Top 1% of US wealth holders. This
is understandable - even top wealth holders are not strictly capitalists and
comprise very well paid professionals and managers. The pure (abstract) cap-
italist class itself would be some proportion of this fraction of the population
with income derived solely from claims on means of production. Secondly,
due to the complexities of wealth ownership through pension investments,
hedge funds and other financial instruments it is unclear from administrative
data as to exactly who exerts claims on the productive capital stock as op-
posed to the non standard definition of capital in Piketty and Zucman (2014).
It is quite possible that the distribution of wealth maybe less concentrated
(say 40%) than the productive capital stock. This can for example occur due
to a more egalitarian ownership of residential assets which may not be part
of the production process, but nevertheless are considered wealth. However
we are reassured that our model and estimates are within the plausible limits
of the Modigliani-Kotlikoff-Summers 20-80% range for US dynastic capital
and closer to the estimate of 80% in Kotlikoff and Summers (1981).
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Figures B.4 to B.6 depict how the economy responds to a disturbance to
the investment function, the profit share, and the capitalists propensity to
save, respectively. On abscissa shows the years after the impulse and the
ordinate shows for each variable the level deviations from the steady state.
Since the underlying model parameters are associated with some uncertainty
reflected by the variance of the distribution, there is also uncertainty as-
sociated with the impulse response functions (IRFs). We report the mean
responses as well as the 90% confidence bands. The size of the impulse is the
mean of the estimated standard deviation of the respective shock.
Figure B.4 illustrates the response of the accumulation rate, the utiliza-
tion rate, and the profit rate to a one-time increase of g by 0.0044 which
is the increase in the accumulation rate on impact. Since the rise in the
utilization rate increases the profit rate, the accumulation rate increases fur-
ther in the second year despite the fact that the impulse is present in only
the first year. The persistence in the data comes from the multiplier effect
and the persistence in the shock process vg. As discussed in our theoretical
model, the distribution of wealth is independent of the parameters of the in-
vestment function so that only shocks to the functional income distribution
and relative saving propensities influence the steady state capitalist wealth
share.
Figure B.5 plots the response to a one standard deviation impulse in the
profit share shock process. The size of the impulse is around 0.02 reflecting
an increase in the profit share by 2 percentage points. This contracts utiliza-
tion through lower consumption demand given the saving differential between
workers and capitalists. Yet, investment increases only moderately. Due to
the redistribution of income, the overall saving rate goes up. The capital-
ist wealth share increases persistently because capitalists accumulate more
wealth by drawing upon the temporary expansion of their income source.
Finally, Figure B.6 depicts the macroeconomic response to a one stan-
dard deviation increase in the capitalist’s propensity to save. The impulse is
an increase of sc by around 20 percentage points. This increases the overall
saving rate and therefore reduces output per unit of capital stock, the profit
rate, and the accumulation rate - thus the downward pressure on aggregate
demand reduces aggregate profitability. The higher propensity to save how-
ever allows capitalists to increase their steady state share of capital stock
and compensate for the loss of income from the lower rate of return.
[Figure 4 about here.]
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[Figure 5 about here.]
[Figure 6 about here.]
5. Discussion
We briefly discuss the implications of our results. Our highly abstract
model is able to capture important aspects of growth and distribution as
evidenced by our computed estimates. Our computations of the capitalist
wealth share (or the proportion of US fixed private assets) as a possible
steady state draws attention to the ownership of productive resources in an
advanced capitalist society. We show in our estimation that such concen-
tration of capital is possible primarily through an extraordinarily high rate
of saving from the accumulated surplus. Our impulse analysis suggests that
negative (positive) shocks to the labor (profit) share have the effect of redis-
tributing wealth to the capitalist class while only mildly boosting investment.
At the same time, an upward shock in the capitalist saving propensity lowers
macroeconomic performance whilst permanently worsening wealth inequal-
ity.
We highlight two important discussions which are lacking in our paper.
Firstly, for simplicity we assume that everyone earns the same rate of return
which is not entirely realistic. In capital markets, the size and composition
of portfolios play an important role in generating a differential rate of re-
turn. In such cases, multiplicative shocks to portfolios would be important
determinant of both trends and cycles of capital accumulation. Secondly we
abstain from discussing the impact of labor markets on the distribution of
income and wealth as well as the role of demographic parameters. We ad-
mit this is an important line of reasoning, especially because we have shown
the functional income distribution (itself related to growth of employment
and bargaining power) to be a critical determinant of capital inequality. We
believe our calibrated models explain our initial questions in a new and suf-
ficient manner for the moment and will continue to add new dimensions just
suggested in further research.
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Appendix A. Specification with full adjustment of the profit share
In our benchmark model, we have assumed a fixed functional income
distribution pi = p¯i. Within the variables we have defined, there exists a
possible steady state where we can relax this assumption and allow the profit
share to fully accommodate the dynamics of growth and distribution. Instead
the forcing variable in the long run is a given steady state growth rate g∗. To
see this, suppose in the long run there exists a pi = pi∗ such that the economy
grows at a rate g = g∗ = scr∗ and hence the distribution of wealth is constant
at Z = Z∗. Solving for pi∗ such that g = g0 + αpiu = g∗ and substituting in
expression (3) we get:
u∗ =
Z∗ (g0 − g∗) (sc − sw) + αg∗
αsw
(A.1)
Since the economy is at a steady state, hence the output-capital ratio should
necessarily be such that u = u∗ = u(pi∗, Z∗). Thus we can equate expressions
(3) and (A.1) to solve for Z∗:
u∗ =








sc − sw (A.2)
Thus assuming this set of assumption delivers a paradox of wealth. In ex-
pression (A.2) an increase in the saving propensity of any class distributes
wealth against them. If capitalists increase their saving rate, then Z∗ de-
clines while if workers increase their rate of saving then (1 − Z∗) declines.
At the same time, we now see the response of investment to profitability α
directly influence the distribution of wealth at the steady state, contrary to
our original results.
Appendix B. Possible wealth distributions
Lemma 1. If capitalists comprise some fraction b of the population, then a
steady state egalitarian wealth distribution would be represented by Z∗ = b or
sw−scp¯i
(sw−sc)p¯i = b. For p¯i =
sw
sc−b(sc−sw) , capitalists will own a share of wealth equal
to their proportion in the population.
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To see this, suppose the Z∗ = b. Substituting (6):
Z∗ =
sw − scp¯i
(sw − sc)p¯i = b
Solving the above for p¯i we get the proposed result
Lemma 2. For sw = 0 or p¯i = 1, wealth is entirely owned by capitalists or
Z∗ = 1. If sw = 0 then this implies workers do not accumulate capital stock
while if pi = 1 then all income is comprised of profits or the entire economy
is made up of capitalists.
This is verified by setting Z∗ = sw−scp¯i
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Figure B.2: Ratio of capital stock to US national income. Source: NIPA, Bureau of
Economic Analysis
22







 Dynamics of Z calibrated to US data
Figure B.3: Phase diagram for Z with parameters calibrated to US data for 1950-1915
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Figure B.4: Macroeconomic responses to a one standard deviation innovation to the in-
vestment shock process.
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Figure B.5: Macroeconomic responses to a one standard deviation innovation to the profit
share shock process.
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Figure B.6: Macroeconomic responses to a one standard deviation innovation to the cap-
italist’s saving propensity process.
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Table B.1: Variable Definition and Data Sources for Observed Variables
Variable Definitions and Data Sources
g (Investment in private fixed assets (I) - Depreciation (D)) / Stock of private
fixed assets (PFA)
u National Income (NI) / Stock of private fixed assets (PFA)
r Income from profits (PI) / Stock of private fixed assets (PFA)
I Investment in private fixed as-
sets
BEA Fixed Assets Accounts tables, Table 1.5,
Line 3
D Current-cost depreciation of
private fixed assets
BEA Fixed Assets Accounts tables, Table 1.3,
Line 3
PFA Current-cost net stock of pri-
vate fixed assets
BEA Fixed Assets Accounts tables, Table 1.1,
Line 3
PI Income from profit≈ rent + in-
terest + corporate profit
NIPA Table 1.12, lines 12,13, and 18
NI National Income NIPA Table 1.12, Line 1
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Table B.2: Estimation results
Parameters prior dist. prior mean prior stddev. post. mean 90% HDP IV
sc0 B .40 .10 .734 [ .641 , .818 ]
pi0 B .30 .10 .188 [ .181 , .196 ]
g0 G .01 .01 .015 [ .008 , .021 ]
α G .30 .10 .214 [ .129 , .294 ]
ρpi B .50 .10 .769 [ .683 , .865 ]
ρsc B .50 .10 .931 [ .908 , .952 ]
ρg B .50 .10 .789 [ .710 , .865 ]
σpi IG .01 .01 .021 [ .710 , .030 ]
σsc IG .01 .01 .214 [ .133 , .298 ]
σg IG .01 .01 .004 [ .003 , .005 ]
Notes: B, U , G and IG denote the Beta, Uniform, Gamma and Inverse Gamma distributions, respectively.
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